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Abstract
Technological progress and the internet brought about new possibilities of creating,
storing, exchanging, replicating, and using various kinds of data for research. This
paper discusses some of the dangers embedded into the reuse of data produced by
some institutions by other institutions through the combination and aggregation of
initial data into various data products. To this end, we use an example of labour market
regulations’ indicators developed by the World Economic Forum, the International
Institute for Management Development (IMD), and the Fraser Institute, which are all
partly based on the World Bank Employing Workers Indicator. We document how these
three indicators compare and identify both their common and specific limitations. For
each of these indicators, the choice of subcomponents and of aggregate techniques
results in different pictures of labour market regulations, despite the use of the
overlapping initial sources of data. Our comparative exercise calls for continuous
efforts to improve the indicators of labour market regulations, as well as for cautious
use of such indicators for research and policy advice.
JEL codes: J00, J8, Y1
1 Introduction
The past decades witnessed a significant burgeoning of empirical studies examining the
effect of labour market institutions on various measures of economic and labour market
performance.1 This burgeoning was naturally propelled by the global economic crisis and
the need to seek empirically grounded policy responses to persisting unemployment and
widening inequalities. It was also facilitated by the development of cross-country time-
series composite indicators of labour market institutions. Some of this development was
facilitated by technological progress and the widespread use of the internet that brought
about new possibilities of creating, storing, exchanging, replicating, and using various
kinds of data for economic research. However, the question of the robustness of empirical
studies based on such indicators has become increasingly critical.
This paper examines some of the dangers embedded into what can be called data
repackaging—i.e. utilization of data produced by some organisms by other organisms
through the combination and aggregation of initial data into various other data prod-
ucts, such as composite indicators. This process is sometimes accompanied by data
misclassification and misinterpretation, as well as by poor acknowledgement of the nu-
ances in the initial data. It can also be viewed as part of “mashuping” of indicators—a
term coined by Ravallion (2012)2 and defined as a process of creating composite
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indicators in which the data producer is only constrained by the availability of data
in choosing what variables to include and by their weights, but not by theory or
empirical practice.
To demonstrate our point, we chose to focus on three composite indicators devel-
oped for measuring labour market regulations, competitiveness, and efficiency, by three
internationally renowned think-tanks. These are the Labour Market Efficiency Index de-
veloped by the World Economic Forum (WEF LME), the Government Efficiency Index
and its labour regulation components developed by the International Institute for
Management Development (IMD), and the Fraser Institute Labor Market Regula-
tions (Fraser LMR) index.
These three indicators are chosen for several reasons. First, they are widely used in
policy-oriented research on the role of labour market institutions. A very partial list of
the most recent works based on either of these indicators includes Freeman et al. 2008;
Feldman 2007, 2009; Javorcik and Spatareanu 2005; Bernal-Verdugo et al. 2013, 2015
(criticized by Aleksynska 2015a, 2015b); or Prados de la Escosura 2016 (who also dis-
cusses some of these indicators’ drawbacks). These indicators are also widely cited in
the media and are seriously taken by businesses and by governments for formulating
policy advice, especially in countries with rich reform agenda, such as Ukraine, or
countries of the Arab Spring world.3 Second, all three indicators share the same charac-
teristic: they aim at capturing labour market institutions in general and at describing
them with one number. In this respect, they are different from, for example, the widely
used and acclaimed OECD Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) indicator or a re-
cently launched ILO EPLex indicator, which are aimed at describing in depth one spe-
cific labour market institution—employment protection legislation. It is for this reason
that such other indicators measuring just one type of institution are not considered in
the systematic analysis of this paper, though we occasionally refer to them. Lastly, all
three indicators under review are partly or fully based on data produced by other
institutions. This is a common feature of the three indicators, which is not shared
by some other famous indicators in the field, such as the Deakin et al. (2007) indi-
cators. One consistently used data source for the three indicators under review is
the Employing Workers Indicator (EWI), a subindicator of the Ease of Doing Busi-
ness indicators developed by the World Bank. The Fraser LMR indicator also con-
tains data produced by the WEF and IMD.
In what follows, we provide a critical overview and a comparison of these indicators
of labour market regulations. Our main findings are three.
First, we highlight that while each of these indicators claims to be original and having
a somewhat different objective from others, each of them systematically uses the whole,
or parts of, the World Bank EWI—a series of indicators developed by the World Bank
and measuring some specific aspects of labour regulations. Originally, EWI was part of
the aggregate Ease of Doing Business indicator used to rank countries. However, its use
in the aggregate Ease of Doing Business indicator has been discontinued by the World
Bank, though the Bank still collects the data. In systematically using the World Bank
EWI data, the WEF, IMD, and Fraser take liberty in renaming and rescaling various
components of the original World Bank Employing Workers Indicator. But mainly,
they fail to properly acknowledge the appropriateness of using this source to construct
their own composite indicators. They also fail to properly track and acknowledge the
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methodological changes in the original data series. In fact, the World Bank EWI
has been extensively reviewed and assessed as not being suitable for inclusion into
the overall aggregate Doing Business indicator or for ranking countries. Following
initial important criticism from academia, civil society, and other international or-
ganizations (see notably Berg and Cazes 2008; Lee et al. 2008), it underwent an in-
dependent evaluation (World Bank 2008), an examination by a consultative group
(World Bank 2011), and a review by an independent panel (World Bank 2013).
These evaluations resulted in several significant methodological changes introduced
to the EWI. Most importantly, it was determined that, although the World Bank
may continue gathering raw data underlying EWI, the World Bank would suspend
using the EWI to calculate the aggregate Ease of Doing Business indicator or rank
countries based on it, as well as would stop referring to the EWI when formulating
policy advice. According to the Final Report of the Independent Panel (ibid), “The
Bank’s decision to suspend the EWI acknowledged the problems inherent in meas-
uring only the costs of labour-market regulation and not the benefits. The Panel
agrees with the Bank’s reasoning [World Bank, 2009] that ‘a comprehensive ap-
proach in advice on labour market policies is needed’”. However, not only do the
methodological notes accompanying the three indicators under the review of this
paper not acknowledge these important debates but also they use the EWI data to
construct their own composite indicators and to rank countries, thus disregarding
significant recommendations and the decisions taken by the World Bank itself.
Thus, another objective of this paper is to raise awareness among the WEF, IMD,
and Fraser data users about the debates surrounding the data used to construct
these composite indicators.
Second, we uncover additional caveats in the three respective composite indicators.
These include trivial aggregation of de jure and de facto measures, the use of opinion
surveys that may not represent all types of firms, and frequent methodological changes,
which render data incomparable over time. These methodological changes include add-
ing or removing individual components from aggregate indicators from one data year
to another and changing the methodology and definitions of these components. Some
of the composite indicators contain sample-dependent data, which should neither be
aggregated with data from other sources nor used in comparative purposes over time if
the sample changes—and this is not always the case.
Third, we show how, despite the use of the same common source, resulting compos-
ite indicators produced by the three intuitions differ from each other. As a result, each
of the indicators provides a different outlook of labour market regulations, potentially
creating confusion for policymakers. The uncovered limitations and shortcomings in
the three composite indicators do not help advancing the controversial debate on the
role of labour market institutions.
While previous research has already highlighted several problematic areas with the
composite indicators that we consider (for example, Ochel and Röhn 2006 review the
overall IMD, WEF, and Fraser indices prior to 2005, not just their labour regulations
subcomponents), the wide recent use of subcomponents measuring labour market reg-
ulations for ranking countries and providing policy advice calls for a more in-depth
overview of such specific components based on the post-2005 data. Our paper also re-
joins a growing literature that is critical of composite indicators more generally, such as
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Ravallion (2012) and Stiglitz et al. (2009) who provide a general perspective on advan-
tages and disadvantages of composite indicators in various fields, without focusing on
labour market regulations specifically.
The three reviewed indicators, and the databases to which they are associated,
are somewhat different from the “internet” data in the strict sense that has recently
emerged in social sciences (Askitsas and Zimmemann 2015), as they are not gener-
ated by simple internet users, for example, through their search activities. However,
they are similar to the “internet data” in the sense that the fast development of
technologies permitting instantaneous, open, unlimited, and mostly free access to
data generated by some organisms to other organisms facilitates the development
of secondary online databases and composite indicators based on them. It helps to
save on costs of original data collection and also of data use, as original sources
provide data in a ready-to-use standardized format. The digital revolution also per-
mitted virtually unlimited storage of newly created data products and allowed sav-
ing costs associated with their publicizing on the net. Thus, we can expect to see
a growing number of similar databases and indicators in the future, an expectation
also flagged by Ravallion (2012).4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a comparative over-
view of the selected indicators. It shows how the World Bank Employing Workers Indi-
cator is systematically found among the Fraser, WEF, and IMD composite indices’
ingredients. It also examines the appropriateness of the underlying subcomponents,
data sources, and aggregation techniques adopted by the three indicators. Section 3 ex-
plores how the selected indicators correlate with each other and with key labour market
outcomes. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Comparative overview of selected composite indicators
2.1 Methodological description of the three composite indicators under review
In a world with unlimited information and numerous and growing measures of institu-
tions and environments, composite indicators gained popularity because of their ability
to describe a complex reality by means of few, sometimes just one, number. They are
often easier to interpret and compare across countries and over time than a battery of
separate indicators. Composite indicators are used by businesses to rank countries in
order to assess their investment attractiveness, as well as by governments to see their
relative position and benchmark best practices. They are also extensively used by aca-
demic researchers in need of cross-country time-series parsimonious data. However, if
poorly constructed or misinterpreted, composite indicators may also send misleading
policy messages and lead to simplistic conclusions (Saisana and Tarantola 2002; OECD
2008; Stiglitz et al. 2009).
The three composite indicators considered in this paper are produced by three
international think-tanks in order to rank countries on competitiveness and obsta-
cles to growth (WEF and IMD) or on economic freedom (Fraser). Each of these in-
dicators is composed of dozens of baseline indicators, which are usually first
aggregated into subindicators. The WEF and Fraser contain such composite subin-
dicators of labour market institutions that we will thoroughly review. While the
IMD does not have a separate subindicator for labour area, individual components
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related to labour institutions are part of the government efficiency subindicator
that in its turn constitutes part of the global efficiency and competitiveness
indicator.
Table 1 presents a summary overview of the composite subindicators examined in
this paper and governing labour regulations area. The exact topics covered differ across
the indicators and range from survey questions on labour-employer relations and wage
determination to statistical data on female labour force participation, to de jure infor-
mation on hiring and firing regulations. At the same time, significant topical overlaps
can be observed. Each indicator under review also gives a different logic both to the
collected data and to the labour market indicators based on them, though a broad
name “regulations” or “institutions” may apply. Table 1 also includes the description of
the World Bank Employing Workers Indicator, because, as will be shown further, it
constitutes an important part of the three indicators under review.
As detailed in Table 1, the subindicator produced by the World Economic Forum,
the Labor Market Efficiency (LME), is part of the broader Global Competitiveness Index
(WEF GCI) which measures and ranks competitiveness throughout the world, defined
as a “the set of institutions, policies, and factors that determine the level of productivity
of a country” (WEF Reports, various issues). Along with the aggregate GCI index, the
WEF LME index is used to rank countries and track changes in rankings over time.
While some of the information pertaining to the functioning of the labour markets has
been collected by the WEF for over two decades5, it is not before 2004 that the LME
index emerged formally as one of the 12 “pillars of productivity and competitiveness”
of which GCI is comprised. The overall CGI aggregation procedure is fairly complex,
but the aggregation of the LME index is straightforward and is based on an arithmetic
mean. In Appendices 1, 2, and 3, we carefully document the number of underlying
components of the LME index (nine in the latest available report), their definitions,
data sources, and evolution over time, which is particularly remarkable.
The aggregation methodology behind the WEF GCI overall composite indicator var-
ied over the years. Starting from the 2009–2010 report, a uniform aggregation method-
ology was applied for computing the GCI in the following three steps. First, individual
variables that form the basis for the index are split into 12 topical areas. They are aver-
aged within these topical areas using a simple arithmetic mean to produce the values
for the 12 “pillars of competitiveness”, LME being one of them. Second, these pillars
are aggregated into three subindexes, each pillar getting a fixed weight. For example,
the LME pillar is aggregated into the Efficiency Enhancers subindex with the weight of
17 %. Third, the three subindexes are aggregated into the overall CGI but with weights
that vary across countries, depending on the development stage of an economy. To de-
termine this stage, countries are subdivided into five groups based on their GDP per
capita and exports of mineral goods. Further, a maximum likelihood regression of GDP
per capita is run against each subindex for past years, allowing for different coefficients
for each stage of development. Finally, econometric estimates from these regressions
are rounded to produce the stage-dependent weights for the three subindexes. The ro-
bustness and validity of this methodology was assessed and confirmed on numerous oc-
casions (see, for example, WEF 2010–2011 Report, Chapter 1.1). However, the fact that
the outcome measure (GDP) is used as an input measure (for producing weights for
CGI subindexes) means that, in principle, the CGI should not further be used in
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Table 1 Overview of selected institutional databases and composite indicators, labour market subcomponents
Name Area covered Period Countries Nature of the data LM indicator: rationale





and firing practices, redundancy
costs, pay and productivity,
management role, brain drain,
female participation
2004–2013, annual; earlier data





De facto, de jure, statistical data. Certain
indicators are from an Executive Opinion
Survey. Redundancy Costs and female
participation indicators are based on
EWI WB and ILO KILM, respectively.
“The efficiency and flexibility of the
labour market are critical for
ensuring that workers are allocated
to their most effective use in the
economy and provided with
incentives to give their best effort
in their jobs. Labour markets must
therefore have the flexibility to shift
workers from one economic activity
to another rapidly and low cost,
and to allow wage fluctuations












De jure and de facto. Labour regulations
and unemployment legislation are
measured by Executive Opinion Survey
questions; Redundancy Costs from EWI WB
No separate labour regulations
indicator, but these questions are
used to construct a broader Business
Efficiency index. Its logic: measures
“extent to which the national
environment encourages enterprises
to perform in an innovative, profitable,
and responsible manner”.
Fraser EFW Frazer Institute
Economic Freedom of
the World index
Minimum wage, hiring and firing
regulations, centralized collective
bargaining, mandated cost of hiring,
mandated cost of worker dismissal,
hours regulation, conscription
Systematic annual data on most
of the components from 2002.





De jure and de facto indicators coming
from a range of sources, such as EWI WB,
WEF, IMD, and War Resisters International
survey
“Many types of labour- market
regulations infringe on the economic
freedom of employees and employers.
Among the more prominent are
minimum wages, dismissal regulations,
centralized wage setting, extension of
union contracts to non- participating
parties, and conscription. The labour-
market component is designed to
measure the extent to which these





















Rigidity of Employment index:
Difficulty of Firing, Rigidity of Hours,
redundancy rules; Redundancy Cost
2006–2013, annual 184 countries De jure, based on a hypothetical
case study; an overall summary
indicator is a weighted average
of 3 subindicators, with equal
weights given to each; redundancy
cost is reported separately
“Measures flexibility in the regulation
of hiring, working hours and
redundancy in a manner consistent
with the ILO conventions”
















regression analysis, especially when involving the assessment of its impact on develop-
ment or on macroeconomic outcomes highly correlated with GDP.
The IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook has been published since 1987, and until
1996, it was a joint publication with the World Economic Forum. The IMD does not
have a special index governing labour area, but four individual components related to
this topic—labour regulations, unemployment legislation, immigration laws, and redun-
dancy cost—are used to construct a broader Government Efficiency index. Appendix 4
outlines the definitions and sources of these components. Starting from 2001, the
methodology behind these components, and behind the Government Efficiency index,
unlike the WEF or Fraser indices, remained relatively unchanged. The IMD ranks and
analyses the capability of nations to provide a framework in which companies can com-
pete. The IMD also reports country rankings separately for each individual component.
The IMD aggregation methodology is based on the following principles. The national
environment is divided into four main factors: (1) Economic (domestic) Performance,
(2) Government Efficiency, (3) Business Efficiency, and (4) Infrastructure. Each factor is
divided in 5 subfactors, for a total of 20 subfactors. These 20 subfactors consisted of
over 300 criteria in 2012. The information on labour markets comes under the Govern-
ment Efficiency Factor and Business Legislation Subfactor (Labour Regulations sub-
subfactor) but also under the Business Efficiency factor and Labour Market subfactor. It
is the Labour Regulations sub-subfactor that is the most relevant to measuring labour
market institutions and also the most comparable with other indicators; hence, our
focus is exclusively on it. In contrast, the Labour Market subfactor measures such is-
sues as labour costs and remuneration, working relations, and skills. It also contains
questions related to assessing brain drain (a similar component is part of the Labour
Market Efficiency Index for GCI). From 2004, hard data and survey data are accorded
different weights in the overall ranking. From 2003, 8 regional economies were added
to 51 national economies (the regional economies were removed from 2007 onwards).
In addition, ranks were split in two groups by population size (over 30 million and
smaller than 30 million). From 2004, a customized ranking based on GDP level, popu-
lation size, and region is provided in addition to the overall ranking.
Finally, the Labor Market Regulations (LMR) index produced by the Fraser Institute
ranks countries according to their labour market regulations rigidity and is part of their
Economic Freedom of the World index. As economic “freedom” is considered to be an
ultimate value, any institutional or custom regulation is viewed as reducing such free-
dom. The Fraser Economic Freedom of the World database has been collected since
1997, with data related to labour market regulations since 2001. In the 2012 edition,
the Fraser Economic Freedom of the World index was based on five topical areas: Size
of Government, Legal System and Property Rights, Sound Money, Freedom to Trade
Internationally, and Regulation. Labour institutions is one of the three subcomponents
of the Regulation area, and is based, at the lowest level of disaggregation, on six compo-
nents outlined in Appendix 5. In total, the Fraser Economic Freedom of the World
index is made up of 24 subcomponents and 42 distinct components. Each subcompo-
nent and component is measured on a scale from 0 to 10, 0 reflecting most restrictive
regulations, or the lack of economic freedom. The six components of Labour institu-
tions are averaged (by taking a simple average) to produce a Labour Market Regulation
index subcomponent. Likewise, simple averages are taken to produce indices of topical
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areas and the overall index. Country rankings are based on these averages of subcom-
ponents, areas, and the overall index.
Both the WEF and IMD are partly based on primary data coming from the
WEF and the IMD Executive Opinion Surveys, respectively, though they also con-
tain data from other sources, such as international organizations (ILO and the
World Bank). Fraser, however, is just a data repository, containing WEF and IMD
questions, as well as the World Bank data and also data produced by other
institutions.
2.2 Comparative review of the subcomponents of composite indicators. The resilience of
the World Bank Employing Workers Indicator
The quality and reliability of any composite indicator is necessarily dependent on the
choice of the underlying components, their sources, and on the aggregation scheme. In
general terms, for any given indicator to be sound, it should be based on a solid theor-
etical framework for both the selection and combination of single components into a
meaningful composite index. Individual components should also be selected on the
principles of analytical soundness, comprehensiveness, pertinence to the measured
phenomenon, and also relationship with other individual components (OECD 2008).
Thus, in what follows, we examine the pertinence of the selected indicators according
to these criteria.
Appendices 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 provide the full list, description, and changes over time
of the components for selected composite indicators. One of the most striking features
of the indicators under review is that—despite the differences in their stated objectives
of what they intend to measure—they contain overlapping ingredients. Fraser is just a
data repository, containing WEF and IMD questions. Importantly, all three datasets
systematically include the World Bank Employing Workers Indicator (WB EWI) as one
of their main sources.
Table 2, column 1, shows the WB EWI structure. It consists of the Rigidity of Employ-
ment index, which is based on three subindicators: the Difficulty of Hiring index, Rigid-
ity of Hours index, and difficulty of redundancy index, all of which have several
components in their turn. In addition, the World Bank also publishes the Redundancy
Cost indicator. Table 2 further shows how these data have been used by other institu-
tions in the construction of their indices. It reports data starting from 2007, as this is
the year when the World Bank data started being used in other datasets. Three main
features can be noted.
First, there is a significant variation both across indicators and over time in the type
and the number of WB EWI components used. Both the WEF and IMD initially use
fully the WB EWI data. In 2012, however, both use only Redundancy Costs, most prob-
ably because, starting from 2011, the WB does not report the Rigidity of Employment
index anymore but only the raw data which underlies this index. In contrast, note how
Fraser uses only some, but not all, subcomponents of the Rigidity of Employment index,
without justification of the choice.6 Note also that the Nonwage labour costs compo-
nent is collected and reported by the World Bank, but has not been used for construct-
ing indicators or country rankings—while both the WEF and Fraser, in some editions,
have done precisely this.
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Table 2 The resilience of the World Bank Employing Workers Indicator
Report year WB EWI WEF IMD Fraser
2007 - Rigidity of Employment
➢ Difficulty of Hiring
➢
Rigidity of Hours




behind subcomponents over time: definitions,
assumptions about worker tenure, calculation of
minimum wage ratio, etc.
- Nonwage labour costs
- Rigidity of Employment
- Firing Costs
– - Minimum wages
- Mandated cost of hiring
- Mandated cost of worker dismissal
2008 - Nonwage labour costs (2007)
- Rigidity of Employment (2007)
- Firing Costs (2007)
– - Minimum wages
- Mandated cost of hiring
- Mandated cost of worker dismissal
2009 - Rigidity of Employment (2008)
- Firing Costs (2008)
- Labour market flexibility
- Firing Costs
- Minimum wages
- Mandated cost of hiring
- Mandated cost of worker dismissal
2010 - Rigidity of Employment (2008)
- Firing Costs (2008)
- Labour market flexibility
- Firing Costs
- Hiring regulations and minimum wages
- Hours Regulations
- Mandated cost of worker dismissal
2011 - Rigidity of Employment (2009)
- Redundancy Cost (2009)
- Labour market flexibility (2010)
- Firing Costs (2011)
- Hiring regulations and minimum wages
- Hours Regulations
- Mandated cost of worker dismissal
2012 - Redundancy Cost (2011) - Redundancy Cost (2012) - Hiring regulations and minimum wages
- Hours Regulations
- Mandated cost of worker dismissal
Years reported in brackets refer to data years as reported in the original source, when such information is available. Example: IMD 2011 report uses the WB LM Flexibility data for the year 2010; IMD 2010 report uses
the WB LM Flexibility data, but the year is not reported
Minimum wages: ratio of mandated minimum wage to the average value added per worker, subcomponent of Difficulty of Hiring index
Nonwage labour costs/Mandated costs of hiring: estimate of social security payment (retirement fund, sickness, maternity and health insurance, workplace injury, family allowance, and other obligatory contributions)
and payroll taxes associated with hiring an employee in a fiscal year, expressed as a percentage of the worker’s salary in that fiscal year. This item is measured in the WB Doing Business, but not included in the calculation
of rankings
Rigidity of Employment/Labour market flexibility: Rigidity of Employment index (the average of three subindices: a Difficulty of Hiring index, a Rigidity of Hours index, and a Difficulty of Firing index) on a 0 (best)-to-100
scale. Higher values indicate more rigid regulation
Firing Cost/Redundancy Cost: estimate of the cost of advance notice requirements, severance payments, and penalties due when terminating a redundant worker, expressed in weekly wages. Note changing worker
profile: Reference for 20 years of service is reported prior to the 2012–2013 report; 1, 5, and 10 years of service are reported in the 2012–2013 report
Mandated cost of worker dismissal: based on Redundancy Cost
Hiring regulations and minimum wages: Difficulty of Hiring index; subcomponent of Rigidity of Employment index
















Another issue relates to the time inconsistency with which the WB EWI data are used
in the WEF and IMD composite indicators. Whenever the year of the WB EWI data
can be inferred from the accompanying methodological reports, one can see that the
WB EWI data was used without consistent updates (as in WEF reports 2009 and 2010),
or with time jumps (as between WEF reports 2011 and 2012), or with some of the
components relevant for one year and other components relevant for another year
(IMD report 2011). Note that Fraser does not report exactly which WB EWI edition it
uses. Given this, whenever countries experienced labour market institutional reforms,
the timing of these reforms cannot be tracked properly in the composite indicators
using the WB EWI.
Last, but not least, the WEF, IMD, and Fraser change the names of WB EWI compo-
nents to adjust them to the logic of their indices. Both Fraser and the IMD also system-
atically apply transformation formulas to these data (see Appendices 4 and 5).
These observations are important for several reasons. The fact that the EWI data ap-
pear systematically as part of other composite indicators means that the very significant
decisions taken by the World Bank not to use EWI for aggregating it with other indica-
tors or for ranking countries are disregarded by the IMD, WEF, and Fraser. Moreover,
this also means that the technical data concerns in the original source are carried over
to other composite indicators. Renaming and rescaling the ingredients by the WEF,
IMD, and Fraser also means that the problematic areas are more difficult to track and
that potential problems accumulate. One remarkable example is the changing method-
ology in the EWI data in several editions of the WB reports. Especially significant
changes were made in 2011 following up the WB consultative process7 and explicitly
acknowledged by the World Bank.8 These changes also meant that there were import-
ant breaks in the data series, but they are especially difficult to track in the used com-
posite indicators if changes are not explicitly acknowledged.
Rather, the WEF 2012–2013 report devotes as much as a footnote acknowledging
“further minor adjustments to the data” (footnote 23 on p. 44 of 545). In the IMD,
there is no attention drawn to the changing methodology in the Redundancy Cost vari-
able, the IMD only adjusts the definitions from one report to the other. Neither does
the Fraser 2012 Report attract the user’s attention to the changes in the WB compo-
nents, although it does report new definitions in the appendices. Notably, the definition
of the Fraser Hours Regulations component is accompanied by the following note: “This
component was previously denoted ‘Mandated cost of hiring a worker’ […] In recent
years, the entire labour market area has been dropped from the Ease of Doing Business
project; however, they continue to present the data in a separate section. In order to
maintain as much consistency over time as possible, we have revised the dataset back
to 2002 with these data replacing the previous values”. The report remains silent on
how this revision was effectuated: through additional data collection, extrapolation, or
any other means. The World Bank Ease of Doing Business data for this component are
available only from 2006 onwards.
While the WEF does not make any adjustment to methodological changes, the IMD
states that “whenever there is a major change in methodology, all results are recalcu-
lated for the past 5 years in order to ensure a high degree of compatibility with past re-
sults”. However, comparisons across reports suggest that changes in this variable were
not considered as “major” in order to recalculate past values in new reports. The Fraser
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Institute makes more efforts in this field with its chain-linked methodology in con-
structing the overall indices to correct for changing components and missing values for
comparisons over time. However, the chain-linked index is only available for those
countries that exist in the composite indicator since 2000, but not for those that were
added later. In the 2012 edition, the chain-index methodology is applied only to 74 out
of 144 countries.
Apart from containing the World Bank EWI subcomponents, all three datasets in-
clude different ingredients, without any apparent justification of how and why these
specific variables are chosen. Arguably, the chosen components do not cover the topic
of labour market efficiency, regulations, or institutions exhaustively, leaving aside other
important aspects such as worker protection, safety and health, social security provi-
sions, and labour administration. At the same time, there is a significant repetitiveness
of questions within the same indicators, which is especially pronounced in the case of
Fraser: hiring and firing regulations in the latest available editions are measured in vari-
ous ways by three out of six variables that make up part of the aggregate LMR index
(Appendix 5: Hiring regulations and minimum wages and Mandated cost of worker dis-
missal based on the WB EWI, as well as Hiring and Firing question from the WEF).
The lack of theoretical background or sound analytical approach for the choice of spe-
cific components compromises the indicators’ comprehensiveness. Repetitiveness of
questions, in its turn, means that certain included concepts are double-counted and
that the aggregated indicators are biased in the direction of these over-represented
concepts.
All three composite indicators contain subcomponents based on opinion surveys.
Such questions can only be valuable when they are properly phrased and contain clear
and exhaustive concepts. However, in some instances, the overall phrasing of the ques-
tions does not seem fortunate. For example, the IMD Labor relations question is
phrased as follows: “Labor regulations (hiring and firing practices, minimum wages
etc.) … 1 = are not flexible enough, 6 = are flexible enough”. The questions seems to
cover too many issues which may be contradictory: some countries may have flexible
firing and hiring practices but inflexible minimum wages, either in their level, setting,
or degree of formality. It is thus not clear what aspect of labour regulations the re-
sponse actually reflects. Another example is the WEF Flexibility of Wage Determination
question, which concerns the degree of centralization of the wage setting. It ignores,
however, the coordination of wage bargaining, and no supplementary question exists to
measure it (Ochel and Röhn 2006).
Finally, there is also a significant variation of components not only across but also
within the indicators, both in terms of their number, type, or changing definition of the
same component over time. These changes are especially apparent in the case of the
WEF and Fraser. Since its first appearance in the 2004–2005 report, the WEF LME in-
dicator underwent six changes in the number and types of included components
(Appendices 1, 2, and 3). Since 2001, the Fraser LMR index underwent four changes in
the number and types of included components and also numerous additional changes
in the definitions and data sources of these components (Appendix 5). As both the
WEF and Fraser use secondary sources to collect data, a regular change in the subcom-
ponents creates a feeling that there is a “shopping for questions” driven by concerns
such as data availability from other sources, rather than by theoretical underpinning or
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empirical relevance. These regular changes also compromise the use of these data for
time-series analysis.
But to illustrate further how critical this issue of changing components within indica-
tors can be, consider the following example. For the WEF, both the overall GCI and the
specific LME index are used to track changes in country rankings from one year to an-
other, without taking into account the almost annual changes in the methodology
(components). That is, each WEF annual report provides annual changes in the GCI, as
well as changes in the country rankings based on it, showing the “progress” of countries
towards competitiveness or away from it. However, it is impossible to judge whether
countries move in the rankings because of the genuine changes in the underlying com-
ponents or because of the changes of the components.
The issue can be illustrated using two of the latest available reports, which witnessed
changes in two LME components (Appendix 3): the Rigidity of Employment component
is used in 2011–2012 but not in 2012–2013 report, and the definition of Redundancy
Costs was modified. It is also helpful to find a country which, say, has an increase in
the LME score but a decrease or no change on all those individual components making
part of the index that remain the same between the two reports. Such is the case of
France, for instance (Table 3). It experienced an upward change in the aggregate LME
index (Table 3, column 1). However, it experienced a downward change in seven out of
ten individual components constituting LME in 2011 (columns 2–8). The change in the
eighth component, Female Labour Force Participation (column 9), is too small to imply
significant changes in the indicator. Dropping the ninth component, Rigidity of Employ-
ment component (column 11), between the two reports necessarily drives the index fur-
ther down. With the jump from 32 to 12 weeks, Redundancy Cost (column 10) is the
only component responsible for the reported upward change in the LME index.9 This
change happened exclusively because of the change in the component definition; no ac-
tual change in the Redundancy Cost in France took place in that year. The change in
this component is sufficiently large to offset both the opposite-direction changes on
other components and the opposite-direction change of the index due to dropping of
the Rigidity of Employment component.
All in all, because with each change in the methodology the data are not revised
backwards, neither LME, nor GCI, nor country rankings based on these indices are
suitable for comparisons over time.
Given all of the above, it remains highly questionable to what extent the three com-
posite indicators under review can be used for comparing countries and their regula-
tions over time. Furthermore, the World Bank no longer uses these data for ranking
countries and neither do they aggregate them with other Ease of Doing Business data,
as part of the strategic methodological decision. In contrast, this is precisely what Fra-
ser, the WEF, and the IMD are doing. They provide contemporaneous country rankings
and, in some instances, comparisons of how the rank positions of countries change
over time, ignoring the above-mentioned debates and their constructive outcomes.
2.3 Shortcomings linked to certain data sources
The sources of the underlying data play a critical role in determining the appropriate-
ness of any given indicator. Beyond the systematic inclusion of the WB EWI, two
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Table 3 Evolution of the LME and its underlying components. Example of France
LME Cooperation Flexibility Hiring and Firing Tax Pay and Prod Management Brain Drain Female LFP Redundancy Rigidity of Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
2012 4.41 3.3 5.1 2.5 2.8 3.9 5.0 3.7 0.88 12
2011 4.38 3.4 5.2 2.7 2.8 4.1 5.1 4 0.87 32 52
For components in columns 9, 10, and 11, hard data are reported
For Rigidity of Employment, only hard data are reported by WEF. According to our computation, the min-max converted score is 5.5 in 2011
















further issues can be highlighted: the use of opinion surveys and the use of different
data sources for the same variable.
Indeed, one of the common features of the reviewed datasets is their use of opinion
surveys as one of the main sources of information. Both the WEF and IMD (and hence
Fraser as a repository) are using their own Executive Opinion Surveys to collect data
on labour market rigidities and on other relevant aspects of labour markets. As sug-
gested by their name, respondents are business executives ranging from top to middle
management, and the reported answers hence reflect only the employers’ viewpoint on
labour relations and sometimes with the priors reflecting other countries’ experiences.
Chor and Freeman (2005) contrasted the WEF/Fraser responses with the responses of
union officials, activists, and professors of labour law and industrial relations, to actu-
ally find a strong similarity of the viewpoints on de facto labour practices across these
different groups of stakeholders.
However, sampling modalities and respondents’ selection are different between the
WEF and the IMD. For example, the WEF is carrying out a randomized sampling which
accounts for the sector and firm size distribution of economies. Unlike the WEF, the
choice of firms participating in the IMD survey accounts only for the industries or sectors,
but does not seem to account for the size of the enterprise. This is rather critical for asses-
sing the regulations, as both provisions and their enforcement may vary across firms of
different size. Collective bargaining outcomes also differ tremendously along this dimen-
sion: they may have significant consequences in sizable firms but be virtually inexistent in
small firms. These differences may severely affect the way business executives perceive
overall labour regulations in a country, not just in their firm. Furthermore, the IMD sur-
vey is conducted with “nationals or expatriates, located in local and foreign enterprises in
the country and which, in general, have an international dimension … We try to contact
most IMD alumni” (IMD 2012)10. While for some of the questions measuring economic
performance such respondents may provide valuable insights, for questions of labour
market regulations, they may not be the most suitable group. This is because firms with
an international exposure may have labour practices different from the rest of the econ-
omy (at least because they are bigger in size), they cover mostly the formal sector, and the
business executives of such companies—especially non-nationals—may have their own
priors as to the functioning of labour markets.
Of note is also the fact that in countries where a large portion of disputes are solved
in courts or with mediation, decisions ruling in favour of workers may be pro-cyclical
(Bertola et al. 2000; Ichino et al. 2003). This means that the reported perceptions of
strictness of regulations may reflect these decisions, and hence the economic conjunc-
ture, rather than the factual strictness of regulations. The latter is particularly import-
ant if the data are further used in the regression analysis of economic conjuncture:
simultaneity and reverse causality will likely be an issue.
Another problematic area with some of the composite indicators, and especially with
Fraser, is the use of different data sources for the same variable. This is done in order
to provide considerable time coverage to some of the LM components. Thus, the
Fraser unemployment insurance component at some point was based on data from two
different surveys, the IMD and WEF. However, as shown in Appendix 4, the IMD re-
ports to users converted, rather than actual, survey data, where the converted values
for each country are sample-dependent. The IMD uses a special transformation formula—a
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standard deviation method—which measures the relative difference between economies’
performances. It is this standardized value for each economy that is reported. As a result,
even if the WEF and IMD have a similarly phrased question on unemployment legislation,
the WEF reports survey responses that are independent of the responses provided in other
countries of the sample, while the IMD reports converted scores that are dependent on the
responses provided in other countries of the sample.11 Thus, the IMD cannot be used as a
complementary source of data. Furthermore, it cannot be aggregated with any other data
covering out-of-the-IMD sample countries, because the IMD data values are sample-
dependent.
2.4 The choice of aggregation schemes
There are (at least) three options to aggregate the different dimensions and create a
synthetic indicator: use weights based on theoretical assumptions, give equal weights to
each dimension, or define weights according to their statistical significance. The choice
of a particular weighting scheme may give rise to substantial differences between indi-
cators. Some similarities and differences in aggregation techniques across the reviewed
composite indicators can be highlighted.
While weighting according to an underlying theoretical framework would be an ideal
and robust choice, it is often easier and a priori legitimate to give equal weights to all
dimensions.12 This is the choice made by the WEF and Fraser to simply average the
data, while the IMD gives higher weights to hard data as compared to survey data.
A related issue is then the type of data that is aggregated into an index. The WEF,
IMD, and Fraser all aggregate de facto data, such as survey questions on the flexibility
of regulations, with de jure information, such as weeks of advance notice and severance
pay, also adding aggregated indices of the World Bank and, in some instances, “hard”
statistical data. This different nature of the aggregated variables, and the way they are
grouped together, raises concerns. Simply averaging different types of data does not
allow to account for possible endogeneity between these types of information nor for
the fact that some of the variables reflect outcomes (outputs) of the underlying pro-
cesses measured by other variables (inputs) with which they are averaged. This is the
case of the WEF LME, for example, which imbeds female-to-male employment rates
and information on the difficulty of hiring and firing. The more there are different types
of data included into an index, and the less the endogeneity of the components is taken
into account, the more different the resulting indices are. In addition, aggregating the
“outcomes” data with measures of institutions or perceptions is problematic if a com-
posite indicator is further used to analyse the outcomes. This partly explains why differ-
ent indices correlated differently with unemployment measures.
A further problem with simple averages is that, in the case of overlapping or repeating
information in subcomponents, an aggregate index is biased towards that dimension
(Ochel and Röhn 2006). This latter concern is especially high in the case of the Fraser
LMR index, which contains questions measuring similar phenomena (three out of six, in
the case of Fraser: see Appendix 5). A high correlation between some of these questions
(shown below) suggests that there is a considerable double-counting when these individ-
ual components are averaged into aggregate indices: more weights are given to hiring and
firing practices as opposed to other aspects of labour regulations. Despite this evidence,
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the authors of Fraser reports claim that such simple averaging of six components is the
most objective way to reflect the unknown weights that may also be interdependent.
In addition to this, the Fraser composite indicator has one further serious shortcom-
ing that makes it less than ideal for assessing the evolution of labour market regula-
tions. It relates to the fact that the indicator is computed as a simple ad hoc average of
components according to data availability. Clearly, some of the overall results are thus
driven by data availability and by the values of available components. This is especially
aggravated by the fact that one of the components—conscription—is remarkable for its
discrete values (it takes only values such as 1, 3, 5, and 10, on a scale from 0 to 10) and
for jumps in values (such as from 3 to 10 from one year to another).
The implications for cross-country comparisons of both averaging of available compo-
nents and of including a technically different variable “conscriptions” are illustrated in
Table 4. This Table compares Azerbaijan and Barbados in 2010. Barbados has significantly
lower values of “Hiring and firing regulations” and of “Centralized collective bargaining”
as compared to Azerbaijan. The data on three other components relevant for understand-
ing labour markets in Barbados are missing. It is the particularly high value of the “con-
scription” variable that fully drives the overall result and gives the same overall Labor
Market Regulation score to both countries—in a very misleading way. In total, we were
able to count that, out of 143 countries in the Fraser sample with available data in 2010,
16 have missing data on at least one subcomponent, while aggregate index is reported for
all of them. Out of 121 countries with data in 2003, 25 have missing data on at least one
of the subcomponents, while the aggregate index is reported for all of them.
The authors of Fraser reports use a correcting methodology (chain-linked index) in
constructing the overall indices to account for changing components and missing
values for comparisons over time. Also, revisions backwards are effectuated. However,
they are sometimes effectuated only partially. In such a setting, knowing the historical
evolution of components reported in Appendix 5 may be of help even for those users
who use only the latest editions of the data revised backwards.
This issue is illustrated in Appendix 6. It records the way in which the data reported in ac-
companying databases varied (not just the data themselves) and uses Argentina as an ex-
ample of data values. In 2010, new components were introduced by Fraser. Based on them,
the composite indicator was revised back to 2002, with new components replacing the old
ones. However, prior to 2002, data on old components are still reported in the 2010 and in
2012 editions of the Fraser composite indicator. This is the case for the same topical com-
ponents, such as Impact of minimum wage component, which was based on a WEF GCI
survey question in 2001 and which became Hiring regulations and minimum wage of the
WB DB after 2001, or for the Centralized collective wage bargaining component, which
prior to 2002 reflected the Share of labour force whose wages set by centralized collective
bargaining. It is also the case for discontinuous series, such as Unemployment insurance,
which was replaced by another series, Hours Regulations, from 2002 on. In other words, the
new components replaced the old components, but the actual reported data series behind
the new names reflects old components prior to 2002 and new components after 2002 (see
shaded cells in Appendix 6). Despite the Fraser disclaimer, this confounding of data series
creates artefacts and may lead to wrong interpretations, notably identifying 2002 as a year
of important reforms, which was not the case (see, for example, a discussion between
Bernal-Verdugo et al. 2013 and Aleksynska 2015a).13
Aleksynska and Cazes IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2016) 5:3 Page 17 of 33
Table 4 Fraser 2012 report, data for 2010: comparing selected countries
Countries 5Bi Hiring regulations
and minimum wages






5Bvi Conscription 5B Labour market
regulations
Azerbaijan 8.3 7.2 7.8 8.0 8.8 1 6.9
Barbados 4.8 5.9 10 6.9
















3 How do selected indicators compare?
Given the above-mentioned considerations, do the composite indicators under review tell
us the same story about labour markets? There are at least three ways to look at this issue:
examine the degree of correlation between these indicators; assess whether they provide
similar ordering results, such as country rankings; and gauge their pertinence to the phe-
nomena they are supposed to influence, such as the “health” of the labour markets.
We first examine the correlations between labour market indicators across the compos-
ite indicators under review. In Table 5, aggregate indices are presented in bold and se-
lected subcomponents are in italics. Data are displayed for 2009 as this year offers the
most comparable data availability. We take the IMD sample as a basis for comparisons,
both because it has the smallest sample and because its rankings are sample-dependent.14
From Table 5, both World Bank subindicators—Rigidity Index and Redundancy
Cost—have a relatively strong correlation with the WEF and Fraser aggregate indicators
that are partly based on them (the minus sign is due to the reverse scale of this indica-
tor: higher scores indicate more rigidity). Likewise, the WEF and Fraser (which also
partly uses WEF) aggregate labour market indices show a correlation of 0.61. The simi-
larly phrased WEF survey question on ease of hiring and firing and the IMD survey
questions on flexibility of labour market regulation correlate rather well (0.78). Rela-
tively high correlations may be reassuring from the point of view of the correctness of
the measurement of similar concepts across individual components. However, they also
point to a certain double-counting when these individual components are averaged into
aggregate indices: more weights are given to hiring and firing practices as opposed to
other aspects of labour regulations. At the same time, some correlations, such as be-
tween the WEF Flexibility indicator and the World Bank Redundancy Cost or between




















WEF H&F 0.70 1.00
WEF Flex 0.41 0.57 1.00
WEF Coop 0.78 0.46 0.12 1.00
Fraser LMR 0.61 0.48 0.47 0.38 1.00
IMD LR 0.75 0.78 0.41 0.66 0.52 1.00
WB Rigidity −0.66 −0.61 −0.39 −0.46 −0.72 −0.67 1.00
WB
RedCost
−0.47 −0.19 −0.01 −0.26 −0.62 −0.33 0.27 1.00
OECD EPL −0.50 −0.38 −0.17 −0.22 −0.46 −0.36 0.59 0.51 1.00
Correlations are based on the IMD sample of countries
WEF LME—WEF Labor Market Efficiency Index
WEF and Fraser H&F—WEF Hiring and Firing survey question “Hiring and firing workers is… 1=impeded by regulations,
7=flexibly determined by employers”; one of the components of WEF LME and Fraser LMR
WEF and Fraser Flex—WEF Flexibility of Wage Determination survey question, one of the components of WEF LME and
of Fraser LMR
WEF Coop—WEF Cooperation in labour-employer relations survey question, one of the components of LME
Fraser LMR—Fraser Labor Market Regulations index
IMD LR—IMD Labor relations survey question “Labor regulations (hiring and firing practices, minimum wages etc.) …
1 = are not flexible enough, 6 = are flexible enough”
WB Rigidity—World Bank Rigidity of Employment index
WB RedCost—World Bank Redundancy Cost
OECD EPL—OECD EPL Strictness Indicator (individual and collective dismissals) (OECD 2014)
Source: own calculations
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the WEF Hiring and Firing component and the World Bank Rigidity Cost, are very
moderate. The latter is quite surprising, because WEF Hiring and Firing and the World
Bank Rigidity Cost are supposed to measure very similar concepts, though the former
measures perceptions of regulations, while the latter measures the strictness of the legal
text. In Table 5, we also report correlations between these indicators and the OECD
EPL indicator, as one of the most acclaimed indicators in the field, though only measur-
ing one specific institution (and being most comparable, from this viewpoint, to the
WB Redundancy Cost indicator). Indeed, the OECD EPL’s correlation is strongest with
the WB Rigidity indicator and WB Redundancy Cost; it is, however, quite low with the
WEF and IMD individual subcomponents.
Given these correlations, are countries ranked in a similar way across indicators?15 We
use the WEF and Fraser aggregate labour market indices together with the IMD individual
question on labour market relations to list the “top 20” countries according to their com-
petitiveness, flexibility, efficiency, or ease of dismissal—as provided by each indicator. We
also add the Redundancy Cost calculated by the World Bank for illustrative purposes. As
all datasets have different country samples, the analysis is further restricted to a compar-
able sample, again taking IMD as a reference, because it has the smallest sample size, and
because IMD country rankings are sample-dependent. On its basis, we order the Fraser,
WEF, and WB data to produce our own ranking of the IMD-sample countries.
Table 6 reflects these rank positions of the IMD “top 20” countries within the four sam-
ples. Evidently, these rankings differ dramatically across indicators: the IMD and the WEF
give the same rank only to one country (Hong Kong), while the IMD and the World Bank
give the same rank only to two countries (Denmark and Singapore). The most consist-
ently ranked country across Fraser, the WEF, and the WB is the USA. Apart from this,
each indicator gives a different ranking to the IMD “top 20” countries, and countries like
Malaysia or Israel receive particularly different rankings across indicators. Nine of the
IMD “top 20” countries are not among “top 20” Fraser countries at all, five are out of the
“top 20” WEF ranking, and eight do not enter the “top 20” according to the WB criteria.
Finally, we check the correlations between the selected indicators and total unemploy-
ment rates, long-term unemployment rate, and youth unemployment rate in 2009 (Figs. 1,
2, and 3).16 While correlation does not imply causality, one can observe that, in Fig. 1, stric-
ter regulations are positively correlated with higher unemployment when using the IMD
(individual component), WEF LME (aggregate), and WB Rigidity of Employment index but
negatively when based on the Fraser LMR (aggregate) and WB Redundancy Cost. In Fig. 3,
the Fraser and WB Rigidity indicators have a positive correlation with youth unemployment
rate, though not the IMD, WEF, or WB Redundancy Cost. More generally, across the three
figures, there is not a single outcome that is affected in a consistent way by all of the
indicators.
Given the above, the choice of one particular database and indicator seems to provide
a substantially different picture of labour market regulations. Even if all three compos-
ite indicators have one strong common feature—they are all partly based on the World
Bank EWI—they provide a different outlook of regulations. This is both because they
include other different components and use different aggregation schemes and also be-
cause they use the World Bank EWI in different and not always appropriate ways, as
described above. Overall, this finding calls for a careful use of the different indicators
and for further improvement of existing indicators. Otherwise, the “hidden costs and
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Fig. 1 Correlations between selected labour market indicators and total unemployment rate, 2009 Note:
IMD, Fraser, WEF: higher values indicate more competitiveness, freedom, or efficiency. WB: higher values
indicate more strictness and rigidity. Source: Own computations based on selected composite indicators
and the ILO KILM
Table 6 Countries rankings across indicators. “Top 20”, 2009
IMD LR Fraser LMR WEF LME WB Redundancy Cost
1. Denmark 16 5 1
2. Switzerland 5 2 11
3. Singapore 12 1 3
4. Hong Kong 1 4 9
5. Thailand 36 18 32
6. Malaysia 14 22 37
7. Kazakhstan 21 13 8
8. Japan 8 10 4
9. Canada 4 6 21
10. Turkey 51 53 40
11. Australia 7 8 3
12. Hungary 20 34 23
13. Israel 42 20 39
14. China 39 23 38
15. Finland 37 17 20
16. United Kingdom 9 7 18
17. Norway 48 12 11
18. Taiwan 46 17 38
19. United States 2 3 1
20. Austria 27 2 2
Source: own computations, restricting Fraser, WEF, and WB to the IMD sample of countries
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downside risks, including the diversion of data and measurement efforts, […] risk dis-
torting development policy making” (Ravallion 2012).
4 Conclusions
This paper reviewed three influential composite indicators measuring labour market regula-
tions and their evolution across the world. The ultimate goal of our exercise was to identify
the key areas for improving current data as well as refining results of empirical research
Fig. 2 Correlations between selected labour market indicators and long-term unemployment rate, 2009
Note: IMD, Fraser, WEF: higher values indicate more competitiveness, freedom, or efficiency. WB: higher
values indicate more strictness and rigidity. Source: Own computations based on selected composite indicators
and the ILO KILM
Fig. 3 Correlations between selected labour market indicators and youth unemployment rate, 2009 Note:
IMD, Fraser, WEF: higher values indicate more competitiveness, freedom, or efficiency. WB: higher values
indicate more strictness and rigidity. Source: Own computations based on selected composite indicators
and the ILO KILM
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based on them. We illustrated that these indicators, while useful for summarizing a complex
reality, suffer from several shortcomings. The main ones include a less than careful reuse of
original data produced by others—a pattern that we argue is facilitated by, and will be grow-
ing with, the expansion of technology, easy access to data, easy storage, and data sharing.
They also include an ad hoc choice of underlying components and their frequent changes,
as well as deficiencies in weighting schemes. As a result, different composite indicators
measuring seemingly similar institutional environments actually produce a different outlook
of regulations. Because policy advice on labour market regulations can be substantially af-
fected by the choice of an indicator, it should be done with great caution. The review under-
taken in this paper suggests that none of the considered indicators can be claimed as
sufficiently precise or sufficiently sound for basing coherent policy advice.
Despite the outlined problematic areas with the reviewed composite indicators, it is
still possible to use them for some specific analysis and needs—provided the usage is
based on a clear understanding of what can, and cannot, be done with the data. For ex-
ample, cross-country comparisons within the same year, and based on disaggregated
components, can in many instances provide interesting insights on phenomena mea-
sured by these components. In contrast, other types of data use, such as examining
changes in rankings over time, or time-series analysis based on reviewed composites in-
dicators, are substantially more problematic.
Our findings do not imply that indicators measuring the extent of regulations, or strength
of institutions, should not be produced. Rather, they suggest that such indicators should be
based on more balanced conceptual frameworks and robust methodological choices. This
paper also showed that there is room for improving existing indicators. Already a decade
ago, Bertola et al. (2000) urged that further research to find reliable means of capturing the
complexity of the theoretical and empirical issues involved in creating employment protec-
tion indicators be undertaken. Perhaps more than ever before, there is a great need for cre-
ating transparent, integral, and comprehensive indicators that would provide a more solid
basis for policy advice. There is also a need to raise further awareness about the debates
underlying the indicators, what methodological changes these debates imply, and how dif-
ferent these changes are from genuine reforms reflected in the data.
Endnotes
1For recent reviews, see Betcherman (2012, 2014).
2In web development jargon, a mashup is a web page, or web application, that uses
content from more than one source to create a single new service displayed in a single
graphical interface. The main characteristics of a mashup are combination,
visualization, and aggregation of an already existing data produced by others.
3See, for example, articles in the Financial Times (for example, Johnson, 2015;
Cadman, 2014), posts on research-grounded platform Vox Ukraine (for example,
Coupé, 2015), or ALLAFRICA (for example, Kortam, 2015), discussing or advocating
for reforms inspired by country rankings based on WEF. Most recently, some IMD data
was used in the European Commission (2016) annual report.
4By the time when this paper was completed, we discovered yet another indicator—
indicator of Labour Freedom—which is part of the Heritage Foundation Index of
Economic Freedom. This indicator is also a composite indicator of labour market regu-
lations, and it also heavily draws on the World Bank EWI. The Heritage Foundation
Aleksynska and Cazes IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2016) 5:3 Page 23 of 33
Index of Economic Freedom is produced in partnership with the Wall Street Journal
and also enjoys a considerable impact.
5WEF publishes Global Competitiveness Reports since 1996.
6Likewise, the Global Competitiveness Report contains several opinion survey questions
related to labour market efficiency, but only two were retained by the Fraser Institute.
7This consultative process was led by the ILO, OECD, civil society, the private sector,
labour lawyers, and employer and employee representatives to review the existing
methodology and to adjust it in view of the relevant ILO conventions among other
things. See World Bank, 2011, 2013.
8See http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/labor-market-regulation. Accessed:
January 2016.
9For Redundancy Cost, only hard data are reported by the WEF. It indicates the
downward movement in the number of weeks for France. However, since this is the
move “towards flexibility”, in the computation of the LME index, these data are ad-
justed to the 1–7 scale with 7 meaning “more flexible outcomes”. Thus, a higher value
is given to this component in 2012 as compared to 2011. Our computations using the
min-max conversion formula provided in the report and the full sample of countries
suggest that the scores are 2.2 in 2012 and 1.88 in 2011.
10IMD is a Swiss business school offering various business programmes.
11Fraser used the converted IMD values.
12The WEF undertakes regression analysis to assign data-driven weights to different
components of its overall GCI index, but does not apply a similar procedure for con-
structing its Labour Market Efficiency indicator that is part of the GCI index.
13These authors used the Fraser 2010 data edition and, on its basis, associate signifi-
cant changes in the data with reform processes. The authors kindly provided us with
the list of reforms that they identified in the period from 2000 to 2008. Out of 52 iden-
tified episodes of reforms, 30 occurred in 2002.
14See Appendix 4 for more details. The method used to produce IMD country
rankings does not allow comparing them over time. Each year’s ranking is dependent
on the values of the countries in that particular sample, and on the number of coun-
tries in the sample, which changes from year to year. It thus does not have an out-
of-the-sample value. Note also that the IMD does not have an aggregate indicator of
labour market regulations; rather, measures of labour market regulations (including
the WB components), together with other indicators, are used to produce the busi-
ness framework index. In this chapter, we focus thus only on the most relevant IMD
sub-subcomponents, such as Labor regulations.
15While ranking countries according to their labour market regulations is hardly ap-
propriate (Berg and Cazes, 2008), we reproduce them here for strictly comparative pur-
poses – to compare the composite indicators, and not countries themselves.
16The rich empirical literature has not yet reached consensus on the effect of regula-
tions on aggregate labor market outcomes. Some studies show that stricter regulations
increase unemployment (Lazear, 1990; Scarpetta, 1996; Di Tella and McCulloch, 2005),
while others find no significant effect on aggregate employment and unemployment
(see Boeri, 2011 for a review), yet some others (Addison and Grosso, 1996) find that
longer notice periods given at dismissals are associated with broadly favourable employ-
ment outcomes.
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Table 7 Global Competitiveness Report labour market indicators and changes over time (2001–2004)
Report year 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004
Number of countries 75 80 102
LM indicators 1. Technological innovation and diffusion
• (3.12) Brain Drain
2. Public institutions
• (4.13) Minimum Wage Enforcement
3. Company operations and strategy
• (10.15) Reliance on Professional Management
• (10.19) Hiring and Firing practices
• (10.21) Cooperation in labour-employer relations
• (10.23) Pay and Productivity
1. Technological innovation and diffusion
• (3.12) Brain Drain
2. Company operations and strategy
• (10.15) Reliance on Professional Management
• (10.18) Hiring and Firing practices
• (10.19) Flexibility of Wage Determination
• (10.20) Cooperation in labour-employer relations
• (10.21) Pay and Productivity
1. Human resources: education, health and labour
• (4.09) Brain Drain
2. Company operations and strategy
• (10.15) Reliance on Professional Management
• (10.18) Hiring and Firing practices
• (10.19) Flexibility of Wage Determination
• (10.20) Cooperation in labour-employer relations
• (10.21) Pay and Productivity
Prior to 2004–2005, the Global Competitiveness Report did not calculate the composite Labor Market Efficiency Indicator/Pillar. Instead, labour market indicators were reported individually under various sections, as
presented here
Numbers in brackets next to components’ names reflect the structure of the GCI index and match the numbering of the GCI data tables. The number preceding the period indicates to which pillar the variable belongs

















Table 8 Global Competitiveness Report labour market pillar and changes over time (2004–2008)
Report year 2004–2005 2005–2006, 2006–2007 2007–2008, 2008–2009
Number of
countries
104 117, 125 131, 134
LM efficiency 7th pillar (pilot version)
1. Flexibility
• (6.13) Extent and effect of taxation (weight = ½)
• (9.18) Hiring and Firing practices
• (9.19) Flexibility of Wage Determination
• (9.20) Cooperation in labour-employer relations
2. Female participation
• (4.13) Maternity laws’ impact on hiring women
• (7.08) Private sector employment for women
3. Meritocracy (incentives/effort)
• (4.12) Brain Drain
• (9.15) Reliance on Professional Management (weight = ½)
• (9.21) Pay and Productivity
6th pillar–LM flexibility and efficiency (part of market efficiency)
1. Flexibility
• (8.17; 6.12) Hiring and Firing practices
• (8.18; 6.13) Flexibility of Wage Determination
• (8.19; 6.14) Cooperation in labour-employer relations
2. Efficiency
• (8.14; 6.15) Reliance on Professional Management
• (8.20; 6.16) Pay and Productivity
• (4.08; 6.17) Brain Drain
• (4.09; 6.18) Private sector employment of women
7th pillar
1. Flexibility—50 %
• (7.01) Cooperation in labour-employer relations
• (7.02) Flexibility of Wage Determination
• (7.03) Nonwage labour costs
• (7.04) Rigidity of Employment
• (7.05) Hiring and Firing practices
• (6.04) Extent and effect of taxation (weight = ½)
• (6.05) Total tax rate (weight = ½)
• (7.06) Firing Costs
2. Efficient use of talent—50 %
• (7.07) Pay and Productivity
• (7.08) Reliance on Professional Management (weight = ½)
• (7.09) Brain Drain
• (7.10) Female participation in labour force
To compute LME index, an arithmetic mean is used to aggregate individual variables within a category
Indicators that are followed by weight = ½ enter into the GCI index through two pillars. To prevent double-counting, they are assigned half-weights

















Table 9 Global Competitiveness Report labour market pillar and changes over time (2008–2013)
Report
year
2009–2010 2010–2011, 2011–2012 2012–2013
Number of
countries





• (7.01) Cooperation in
labour-employer relations
• (7.02) Flexibility of Wage
Determination
• (7.03) Rigidity of Employment
• (7.04) Hiring and Firing practices
• (6.04) Extent and effect of taxation
(weight = ½)
• (6.05) Total tax rate (weight = ½)
• (7.05) Firing Costs
2. Efficient use of talent—50 %
• (7.06) Pay and Productivity
• (7.07) Reliance on Professional
Management (weight = ½)
• (7.08) Brain Drain




• (7.01) Cooperation in
labour-employer relations
• (7.02) Flexibility of Wage
Determination
• (7.03) Rigidity of Employment
• (7.04) Hiring and Firing practices
• (7.05) Redundancy Cost
• (6.04) Extent and effect of
taxation (weight = ½)
2. Efficient use of talent—50 %
• (7.06) Pay and Productivity
• (7.07) Reliance on Professional
Management (weight = ½)
• (7.08) Brain Drain




• (7.01) Cooperation in
labour-employer relations
• (7.02) Flexibility of Wage
Determination
• (7.03) Hiring and Firing
practices
• (7.04) Redundancy Cost
• (6.04) Extent and effect of
taxation (weight = ½)
2. Efficient use of talent—50 %
• (7.05) Pay and Productivity
• (7.06) Reliance on Professional
Management (weight = ½)
• (7.07) Brain Drain
• (7.08) Female participation in
labour force
Variables definitions (2001–2002 to 2003–2004 reports)
Brain Drain: survey question: “Scientists and Engineers in your country… 1=normally leave to pursue opportunities
elsewhere, 7=almost always remain in the country”
Minimum wages: survey question: “The minimum wage set by law in your country is…1=never enforced,
7=strongly enforced”
Reliance on Professional Management: survey question: “Senior management positions in your country… 1=are often held
by relatives, 7=go only to skilled professionals”
Hiring and Firing practices: survey question: “Hiring and firing workers is… 1=impeded by regulations, 7=flexibly
determined by employers”
Pay and Productivity: survey Question: “Pay in your country is… 1=not related to worker productivity, 7=strongly related
to worker productivity”
Definitions and sources of additional variables, from 2004–2005 report onwards
Flexibility of Wage Determination: survey question: “Wages in your country are… 1 = set by a centralized bargaining
process, 7 = up to each individual company”
Cooperation in labour-employer relations: survey question: “Labour-employer relations in your country are… 1=generally
confrontational, 7=generally cooperative”
Extent and effect of taxation: survey question: “The level of taxes in your country… 1=significantly limits incentive to
work or invest, 7=has little impact on incentives to work or invest
Maternity laws’ impact on hiring women: survey question: “In your country, maternity laws… 1=impede the hiring of
women, 7=are not a hindrance for hiring women”
Private sector employment of women: survey question: “In your country, private sector employment of women is …
1=limited and usually takes place in less important jobs, 7=is equal to that of men”
Nonwage labour costs: estimate of social security payment (retirement fund, sickness, maternity and health insurance, workplace
injury, family allowance, and other obligatory contributions) and payroll taxes associated with hiring an employee in a fiscal year,
expressed as a percentage of the worker’s salary in that fiscal year. Source: The World Bank, Doing Business
Rigidity of Employment: Rigidity of Employment index on a 0 (best)-to-100 scale. Source: The World Bank, Doing Business
Total tax rate: This variable is a combination of profit tax (per cent of profits), labour tax and contributions (per cent of profits),
and other taxes (per cent of profits). Source: The World Bank, Doing Business
Female participation in labour force: percentage of women aged 14–65 participating in the labour force divided by the
percentage of men aged 14–65 participating in the labour force. The indicator uses a 15–64 age group from GCR’s 2010–2011
report onwards. Sources: International Labour Organization, Key Indicators of the Labour Markets Net (4th edition, 2005);
national sources
Redundancy Cost: estimate of the cost of advance notice requirements, severance payments, and penalties due when terminating
a redundant worker, expressed in weekly wages. Sources: The World Bank, Doing Business. The indicator was referred to as Firing
Costs till WEF’s 2009–2010 report. Note changing worker profile: reference for 20 years of service is reported prior to the 2012–13
report; 1, 5, and 10 years of service are reported in the 2012–2013 report
Hard data are reported as they are. However, in calculating the LME index, it is converted into the 1–7 scale using the
following formula
6 × (country value − sample minimum)/ (sample maximum − sample minimum) + 1
The sample minimum and sample maximum are the lowest and highest values of the overall sample, respectively. In some cases,
adjustments were made to account for extreme outliers in the data
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Numbers in brackets next to components’ names reflect the structure of the index and match the numbering of the IMD
data tables
Variables definitions
Labour Regulations: survey question: “Labour regulations (hiring and firing practices, minimum wages etc.) … 1 = are not
flexible enough, 6 = are flexible enough”
Unemployment Legislation: survey question: “Unemployment Legislation … 1 = does not provide any incentives to look
for work, 6 = provides an incentive to look for work”
Immigration Laws: survey question: “Immigration Laws… 1 = prevent your company from employing foreign labour, 6 =
do not prevent your company from employing foreign labour”
Firing/Redundancy Costs: measures the cost of advance notice requirements, severance payments, and penalties due to a
terminated worker, expressed in weekly wages. Source: The World Bank, Doing Business 2009. This indicator is reported
as Redundancy Cost from 2010 onwards. In 2009–2010, reference is made to the worker profile with 20 years of tenure.
From 2011 onwards, reference is made to the worker’s profile with 1, 5, and 10 years of tenure
Labour market flexibility: The Rigidity of Employment is the average of three subindices: a Difficulty of Hiring index, a
Rigidity of Hours index, and a Difficulty of Firing index. Subindices have several components, all taking a value between
0 and 100, with higher values indicating more rigid regulation. Source: World Bank, Doing Business 2009
All IMD data are reported in terms of standardized values, using the standard deviation method conversion. This allows
measuring the relative difference between the economies’ performances. For each variable, a standardized value is
computed by subtracting the average value of all sampled economies from the economy’s original value and then
dividing the result by the standard deviation. For more information, see IMD reports
Source: IMD 2013
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Appendix 5
Table 11 Fraser Economic Freedom of the World: labour market regulation components and methodology
Year of the
report issue




2000 2000–2004 2005–2007 2008–2010
Number of
countries
58 123–130 141 141–144
Components 1) Minimum wages




6) Top marginal tax rate
1) Minimum wages*





2) Hiring and Firing
3) Collective bargaining
4) Mandated cost of hiring*
5) Mandated cost of worker dismissal*
6) Conscription
1) Hiring regulations and minimum wages*
2) Hiring and Firing
3) Collective bargaining
4) Hours Regulations*





Simple average; reported for
components 1–6 (labour market
regulations) and for components
1–4 (Labour market flexibility)




Simple average of 7 topical areas,
labour market regulations being
one of them
Simple average of 5 topical areas, divided
into 21 subcomponents, labour market
regulations being one of them. These are
further divided into 38 components.
Simple average of 5 topical areas, divided
into 23 subcomponents, labour market
regulations being one of them. These are
further divided into 42 components.
Simple average of 5 topical areas, divided into 23
subcomponents (24 in 2012), labour market
regulations being one of them. These are further
divided into 42 components.
Variables in italics and with asterisks are those for which definitions changed in a reported period
Variables’ definitions and sources, 2001
Minimum wages: survey question: “The minimum wage, set by law, has little impact on wages because it is too low or not obeyed”. Answers: 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree. Source: Global Competitiveness
Report 2000, World Economic Forum (2000)
Hiring and Firing: survey question: “Hiring and firing of workers is … 1=impeded by regulations, 7=flexibly determined by employers”. Source: Global Competitiveness Report 2000, World Economic Forum (2000). The
wording of this question varied slightly over the years
Collective bargaining: 2001–2005: “Share of labour force whose wages are set by centralized collective bargaining” This particular component was not presented in the GCR publication due to space constraints, but the
data were provided directly by the World Economic Forum. From 2006 onwards: “Wages in your country are set by a centralized bargaining process (= 1) or up to each individual company (= 7).” World Economic
Forum, Global Competitiveness Report (various issues)
Unemployment Benefits: survey question: “The unemployment insurance program strikes a good balance between social protection and preserving work incentives”. Answers: 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree.
















Conscription: Data on the use and duration of military conscription were used to construct rating intervals. Countries with longer conscription periods received lower ratings. A rating of 10 was signed to countries
without military conscription. When the length of conscription was 6 months or less, countries were given a rating of 5. When the length of conscription was more than 6 months but not more than 12 months,
countries were rated at 3. When the length of conscription was more than 12 months but not more than 18 months, countries were assigned a rating of 1. When conscription periods exceeded 18 months, countries
were rated 0. Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (various issues)
Top marginal tax rate: Countries with higher marginal tax rates that take effect at lower income thresholds received lower ratings based on the matrix below. The income threshold data were converted from local
currency to 1982/1984 US dollars (using beginning-of-year exchange rates and the US Consumer Price Index). The figures included subnational rates if applicable. Source: Price Waterhouse, Individual Taxes: A Worldwide
Summary (various issues)
Variables’ definitions and sources, changes over time
Minimum wages (from 2002 to 2005): survey question: “The minimum wage set by law in your country is… 1=never enforced; 7=strongly enforced”. Source: Global Competitiveness Reports, World Economic Forum (various issues)
Minimum wages (from 2006 onwards): This component is based on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business data for the ratio of mandated minimum wage to the average value added per worker, a component that is part of
the “Difficulty of Hiring Index”. Countries with higher mandated minimum wages relative to average value added per worker are given lower ratings. The formula used to calculate the 0-to-10 ratings for this component was
as follows: (Vmax − Vi)/(Vmax − Vmin) multiplied by 10. Vi represents the minimum wage to average value added per worker ratio. The values for Vmax and Vmin were set at 79 % (1.5 standard deviations above average) and
0 %, respectively. Countries where the minimum wage was more than 79 % of the average value added per worker were given a rating of 0. Countries with no minimum wage were given a rating of 10. Source: World Bank,
Doing Business (various issues)
Unemployment Benefits (2004): based on two survey questions: (1) IMD survey question “Unemployment legislation”. Answers: 1 = does not provide an incentive to look for work; 6 = provide an incentive to look for work. Source:
International Institute for Management Development (IMD), World Competitiveness Yearbook (various issues). (2) GCR survey question “The unemployment insurance program strikes a good balance between social protection and
preserving work incentives”. Answers: 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree. Source: Global Competitiveness Reports, World Economic Forum (various issues)
Unemployment Benefits (2005, 2006): based on IMD survey question “Unemployment legislation”. Answers: 1 = does not provide an incentive to look for work; 6 = provide an incentive to look for work. Source: International Institute
for Management Development (IMD), World Competitiveness Yearbook (various issues)
Conscription (from 2006 onwards): source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (various issues); War Resisters International, “Refusing to Bear Arms: A World Survey of Conscription and Conscientious
Objection to Military Service,” <http://www.wri-irg.org/co/rtba/index.html>
Mandated cost of hiring: This subcomponent is based on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business data on the cost of all social security and payroll taxes and the cost of other mandated benefits including those for retirement,
sickness, health care, maternity leave, family allowance, and paid vacations and holidays associated with hiring an employee. The formula used to calculate the 0-to-10 ratings was as follows: (Vmax− Vi)/(Vmax− Vmin) multiplied by
10. Vi represents the hiring cost (measured as a percentage of salary). The values for Vmax and Vmin were set at 33 % (1.5 standard deviations above average) and 0 %, respectively. Countries with values outside of the Vmax and
Vmin range received ratings of either 0 or 10 accordingly. Source: World Bank, Doing Business (various issues)
Mandated cost of worker dismissal (from 2007 onwards). This subcomponent is based on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business data on the cost of the advance notice requirements, severance payments, and penalties due
when dismissing a redundant worker. The formula used to calculate the 0-to-10 ratings was as follows: (Vmax − Vi)/(Vmax − Vmin) multiplied by 10. Vi represents the dismissal cost (measured in weeks of wages). The values for
Vmax and Vmin were set at 108 weeks (1.5 standard deviations above average) and 0 weeks, respectively. Countries with values outside of the Vmax and Vmin range received ratings of either 0 or 10 accordingly. Source:
World Bank, Doing Business (various issues)
Hiring regulations and minimum wages (from 2010 onwards). This subcomponent is based on the World Bank’s Doing Business, Difficulty of Hiring index, which is described as follows: “The difficulty of hiring index measures (i)
whether fixed-term contracts are prohibited for permanent tasks; (ii) the maximum cumulative duration of fixed-term contracts; and (iii) the ratio of the minimum wage for a trainee or first-time employee to the average value
added per worker. An economy is assigned a score of 1 if fixed-term contracts are prohibited for permanent tasks and a score of 0 if they can be used for any task. A score of 1 is assigned if the maximum cumulative duration of
fixed-term contracts is less than 3 years; 0.5 if it is 3 years or more but less than 5 years; and 0 if fixed-term contracts can last 5 years or more. Finally, a score of 1 is assigned if the ratio of the minimum wage to the average value
added per worker is 0.75 or more; 0.67 for a ratio of 0.50 or more but less than 0.75; 0.33 for a ratio of 0.25 or more but less than 0.50; and 0 for a ratio of less than 0.25.” Countries with a higher difficulty of hiring are given lower
ratings. This component previously measured only the minimum wage subcomponent of the Difficulty of Hiring index. From 2010, the data have been revised back to 2002. Source World Bank, Doing Business (various issues)
Hours Regulations (from 2010 onwards): This subcomponent is based on the World Bank’s Doing Business, Rigidity of Hours index, which is described as follows: “The rigidity of hours index has 5 components: (i) whether there are
restrictions on night work; (ii) whether there are restrictions on weekly holiday work; (iii) whether the work-week can consist of 5.5 days; (iv) whether the work-week can extend to 50 hours or more (including overtime) for 2
months a year to respond to a seasonal increase in production; and (v) whether paid annual vacation is 21 working days or fewer. For questions (i) and (ii), when restrictions other than premiums apply, a score of 1 is given. If the
only restriction is a premium for night work and weekly holiday work, a score of 0, 0.33, 0.66, or 1 is given according to the quartile in which the economy’s premium falls. If there are no restrictions, the economy receives a score
of 0. For questions (iii), (iv) and (v), when the answer is no, a score of 1 is assigned; otherwise a score of 0 is assigned.” Countries with less rigid work rules receive better scores in this component. This component was previously
named “Mandated cost of hiring a worker”. Because of the pressure from ILO, this indicator was dropped from Doing Business. In order to maintain as much consistency over time as possible, the data have been revised back to
2002 with these data replacing the previous values. Source World Bank, Doing Business (various issues)
















Table 12 Fraser Economic Freedom of the World: components and methodology. Example of Argentina
Column (1) corresponds to the year on which a Fraser report was released, together with accompanying data. Column (2) shows sample years, and subsequent columns show data for these specific sample years, as
reported in accompanying data files. The names of the components (including crossed out words) are reported as in the Fraser accompanying data files. For the 2003 report year, missing column (7) is deliberately
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